City University of New York Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 1

Winter 2022

Who’s Afraid of Bob Jones? “Fundamental National Public Policy”
and Critical Race Theory in a Delicate Democracy
Lynn D. Lu
CUNY School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lynn D. Lu, Who’s Afraid of Bob Jones? “Fundamental National Public Policy” and Critical Race Theory in a
Delicate Democracy, 25 CUNY L. Rev. 93 (2022).
Available at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/12

The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more
information please contact cunylr@law.cuny.edu.

Who’s Afraid of Bob Jones? “Fundamental National Public Policy” and Critical
Race Theory in a Delicate Democracy
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Hayes Holderness for generous feedback and to Ian Sinclair of the CUNY Law Review for
excellent editorial advice. I am grateful to the organizers and participants in the Law & Society
Association 2021 Virtual Conference and Collaborative Research Network on Law, Society, and Taxation
for the opportunity to present an early version of this work.

This article is available in City University of New York Law Review: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol25/iss1/12

WHO’S AFRAID OF BOB JONES?
“FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY”
AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN
A DELICATE DEMOCRACY
Lynn D. Lu†

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 93
I. READING BOB JONES........................................................... 96
A. The Road to the Supreme Court .................................. 96
B. A Roadmap to “Fundamental National
Public Policy” ............................................................. 99
II. BOB JONES: SLIPPERY SLOPE OR DEAD END? .................... 103
A. Testing the Limits of FNPP ....................................... 103
B. Unanswered Questions.............................................. 105
1. Pluralism ............................................................. 105
2. Remedies for Racial Discrimination ................... 107
3. Redistributive Economic Justice ......................... 108
III. LOOKING FORWARD ......................................................... 109
A. Dueling Views of CRT ............................................... 109
B. CRT and the Current Supreme Court........................ 113
CONCLUSION........................................................................... 118
INTRODUCTION
In Summer of 2021, Republican legislators across the United States
introduced a host of bills to prohibit government funding for schools or
agencies that teach critical race theory (“CRT”),1 described by the
American Association of Law Schools not as a single doctrine but as a set
† Lynn D. Lu is Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Economic Justice Project
at CUNY School of Law. Thanks to Hayes Holderness for generous feedback and to Ian Sinclair of the CUNY Law Review for excellent editorial advice. I am grateful to the organizers
and participants in the Law & Society Association 2021 Virtual Conference and Collaborative
Research Network on Law, Society, and Taxation for the opportunity to present an early version of this work.
1 Cathryn Stout & Gabrielle LaMarr LeMee, Efforts to Restrict Teaching About Racism
and Bias Have Multiplied Across the U.S., CHALKBEAT (July 22, 2021, 1:12 PM),
https://perma.cc/N4T7-XRNS (documenting efforts in different states); e.g., Stop CRT Act,
H.R. 3179, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021).
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of “frameworks” to “explain and illustrate how structural racism produces
racial inequity within our social, economic, political, legal, and
educational systems . . . even absent individual racist intent.”2 Characterizing such an explicitly race-conscious analysis of legal and social
institutions as “divisive,”3 opponents of CRT, such as former Vice
President Mike Pence, labeled it “nothing short of state-sponsored and
state-sanctioned racism.”4 Calls by Republican politicians to defund CRT
echoed the views of Pat Robertson, a veteran of the religious right, who
exhorted audience members of the Christian Broadcasting Network
program The 700 Club to mobilize against the use of taxpayer dollars to
teach CRT: “Realize this is a movement across the nation, because the
schools are being used all across America to indoctrinate your children,
at your expense.”5
The political campaign to “Stop CRT,” as articulated by strategist
Christopher Rufo, seeks to redirect the time-honored civil-rights strategy
of defunding racially discriminatory social institutions for use against
race-conscious efforts to remedy the ongoing disparate racial, economic,
and other social effects perpetuated by the same institutions.6 The
movement to Stop CRT thus seeks to freeze civil rights progress where it
stood decades ago, as when the Supreme Court acknowledged a
“fundamental national public policy” against racial segregation in its
1983 decision in the notorious case of Bob Jones University v. United
States,7 while leaving unresolved vital questions about whether and how
to allocate public resources affirmatively to foster diversity, equity,
inclusion, and accessibility in democratic society.8
In Bob Jones, the Court upheld the federal taxation of private schools
that excluded Black students because their religious beliefs allegedly
2 Press Release, The Ass’n of Am. L. Sch., Statement by AALS on Efforts to Ban the
Use or Teaching of Critical Race Theory (Aug. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/67RN-V8XM.
3 Heritage Explains, How Critical Race Theory is Dividing America, HERITAGE FOUND.,
at 07:54 (Oct. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/W7J5-MQUD.
4 Brendan Cole, Mike Pence Brands Critical Race Theory ‘State-Sanctioned Racism’,
NEWSWEEK (June 25, 2021, 5:05 AM), https://perma.cc/N6V6-3RRZ (“Pence has become the
latest GOP voice in condemning critical race theory . . . [arguing that] ‘[o]ur party must ensure
that critical race theory is expelled from our schools, our military, and our public institutions.’”).
5 The 700 Club, YOUTUBE (June 24, 2021), at 11.56-12.30, 13.16-13.38, https://youtu.be
/BdOzpwHhhoQ.
6 See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, How a Conservative Activist Invented the Conflict Over
Critical Race Theory, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/7AL6-SS5M; Virginia
Allen, Legal Coalition to Sue to Stop Feds’ Critical Race Theory Training, THE DAILY SIGNAL
(Feb. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/E8MF-Q3DZ; see also Stop Critical Race Theory Newsletter,
CHRISTOPHER RUFO, https://perma.cc/RBK9-26YK (last visited Nov. 8, 2021).
7 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983).
8 See infra Part II-B.
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mandated “racial separation.”9 Specifically, the Court ruled that the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) properly withheld federal tax-exempt
status from otherwise qualifying entities to enforce “fundamental national
public policy” (“FNPP”), as expressed by all three branches of the federal
government, against racial segregation in schools,10 and deemed
desegregation a compelling government interest that outweighed any
burden on religion.11
As a private tax dispute, Bob Jones stands alongside legions of other
complaints brought by taxpayers aggrieved by IRS actions. But as a case
involving an educational institution raising a religious liberty claim
against antidiscrimination regulation, Bob Jones raised broader public
law issues involving constitutional and federal statutory interpretation, as
well as issues involving judicial review of administrative action.12
Announced after more than a decade of litigation spanning four
presidential administrations, Bob Jones inspired a wide range of strong
public reactions: condemnation from religious entities accustomed to
insulation from government regulation,13 optimism in civil rights
claimants seeking to expand antidiscrimination protections beyond
intentional race discrimination,14 and criticism from legal analysts who
viewed the Court’s reasoning as “judge-created policy masquerading as
law.”15
This Article assesses the legal and symbolic influence of Bob Jones
not to relitigate the case or to rewrite history, but to highlight the case’s
lasting impact and lessons for future civil rights advocacy, especially as
informed by critical race theories that developed alongside the federal
courts’ retreat from enforcing existing antidiscrimination norms.16 Part I
examines Bob Jones and its history to show how its political and legal
9 Olatunde Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion,
and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES, 126,
139 n.80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011) (describing the deposition testimony of
Goldsboro Christian School witness).
10 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593 (“Over the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national
policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public education.”).
11 Id. at 604.
12 See infra Part I-B.
13 Johnson, supra note 9, at 127 (quoting Bob Jones III, founder and president of Bob
Jones University, as saying, “We’re in a bad fix in America when eight evil old men and one
vain and foolish woman can speak a verdict on American liberties.”); id. at 155-56.
14 Id. at 127, 155.
15 Id. at 158.
16 See, e.g., Alexander Reinert et al., New Federalism and Civil Rights Enforcement, 116
NW. L. REV. 737, 751-52 (2021) (describing how “over time, whether by inadvertence or design, the Supreme Court has . . . limited the intended power of the statute [42 U.S.C. § 1983]
to compensate, deter, and articulate rights”).
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context shaped its unique posture and path to the Supreme Court. Part II
examines the afterlife of Bob Jones and its symbolic importance to
conservatives motivated to prevent its expansion, even as the decision
limits its own impact by leaving crucial substantive questions unresolved:
namely, the role of pluralism in enforcing civil rights against First
Amendment claims, the viability of race-conscious remedies for racial
discrimination, and the visibility of redistributive economic justice
concerns. Finally, Part III shows how CRT’s insistence on confronting
those same questions reveals persistent inequities sustained by U.S. social
and legal institutions, drawing the fire of efforts to Stop CRT. Part III
further assesses the prospects for moving the difficult questions left
unresolved in Bob Jones back to the center of legal analysis, even with
the current Supreme Court in a polarized and partisan political climate.
The Article ultimately concludes that the legal reorientation demanded by
Bob Jones and initiated by critical theorists, whatever their fate in the
Court’s jurisprudence in the near term, remains crucial for identifying and
challenging ongoing power disparities in and through every level of
democratic government and society.
I.
A.

READING BOB JONES

The Road to the Supreme Court

Bob Jones reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983 after more than
a decade of litigation initiated by civil rights advocates seeking to defund
racial discrimination wherever found, but it was complicated by the tax
administration context in which the particular dispute arose. Litigation
began in 1969 with Green v. Kennedy, a case in which Black plaintiffs in
Mississippi sought to compel the IRS to revoke tax-exempt status from
racially segregated private schools17—so-called “segregation academies”—that enabled White flight from public schools.18 The three-judge
federal district court panel acknowledged but avoided deciding the
plaintiffs’ “serious constitutional claims” of race discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause,19 as well as whether federal tax-exemption for
17 Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1129-30 (D.D.C. 1971), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
18 Johnson, supra note 9, at 131 (“In some communities, the white student body moved
en masse to a new private school, taking the indicia of the old schools, such as the school
colors, symbols, and mascots.”); see generally CAMILLE WALSH, RACIAL TAXATION: SCHOOLS,
SEGREGATION, AND TAXPAYER CITIZENSHIP, 1869–1973 (2018) (chronicling the development
of “taxpayer identity” as a form of White supremacist backlash against claims for racial equity
in the allocation of public resources, primarily education).
19 Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65 (D.D.C. 1971), summarily aff’d sub
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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public charities—including eligibility to receive tax-deductible charitable
contributions20—amounted to “federal financial assistance” under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 Instead, the panel construed the
Internal Revenue Code’s tax-exemption scheme “in consonance with the
Federal public policy against support for racial segregation of schools,
public or private.”22 By the time the district court permanently enjoined
the IRS from recognizing tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory
private schools in Mississippi in 1971,23 the IRS had already issued policy
guidance prohibiting racial discrimination in tax-exempt private schools
nationwide and notified certain racially segregated private schools outside
Mississippi that the IRS would no longer treat them as exempt from
federal taxation.24
Bob Jones University (“BJU”), located in South Carolina, challenged
the IRS’s threatened revocation of its tax-exempt status in federal court,
alleging that the agency’s antidiscrimination policy unconstitutionally
infringed on the school’s free exercise of religion, in particular, its
“genuine belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage.”25
Established as a “thoroughly Christian college that stood on the absolute
authority of the Bible to train America’s youth,”26 BJU excluded all Black
students from training until 1971, when the school began accepting
applications from Black students so long as they were “married within
their race.”27 The IRS argued in response that BJU’s lawsuit was barred
by the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition on pre-enforcement action to
“restrain[] the assessment or collection of any tax,”28 ultimately

20 I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(3) (setting forth definitions and requirements for tax-deductible charitable contributions, and tax-exempt entities, respectively).
21 Green, 330 F. Supp. at 1163-65. For a discussion on the applicability of § 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to charitable tax deductions, see generally David
A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil
Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. REV. 167 (2001) (analyzing
arguments that tax-exemption for public charities, social clubs, or other entities qualifies as
federal financial assistance).
22 Green, 330 F. Supp. at 1163.
23 Id. at 1163, 1165, 1179.
24 Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Johnson, supra note 9, at 132-34.
25 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 602-603, 602 n.28 (1983).
26 History of BJU, BOB JONES UNIV., https://perma.cc/E5A8-7E32 (last visited Aug. 30,
2021).
27 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 580.
28 Id. at 581; I.R.C. § 7421(a) (“[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such
person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.”).
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prevailing when the case reached the Supreme Court for the first time in
1974.29
After the IRS carried out its threat to treat BJU as a taxable entity,
BJU paid a Federal Unemployment Tax Act (“FUTA”) tax of “$21.00 on
one employee for the calendar year of 1975” and filed a new federal court
action seeking a refund, again on the ground that the IRS’s antidiscrimination policy for private schools unconstitutionally burdened the school’s
exercise of religious freedom.30 The IRS, in turn, “counterclaimed for
unpaid federal unemployment taxes for the taxable years 1971 through
1975, in the amount of $489,675.59, plus interest.”31 BJU subsequently
began “permitt[ing] unmarried [Black students] to enroll,” but subjected
all admitted students to “a disciplinary rule prohibit[ing] interracial dating
and marriage.”32
As the Bob Jones lawsuit wound its way through the courts a second
time, the IRS clarified its antidiscrimination policy for private schools
seeking tax-exempt status.33 A 1975 Revenue Procedure required schools
to publish non-discriminatory admission policies and to maintain records
documenting their compliance in order to maintain tax-exempt status.34
Meanwhile, civil rights advocates continued to press the IRS to enforce
fully its existing antidiscrimination policy against noncompliant schools,
as well as to revise its policies further to require evidence of actual
integration at schools that publicly espoused antidiscrimination norms but
remained disproportionately White.35
As Olatunde Johnson recounts in detail, the battle over how to
desegregate public and private schools involved intense interactions
among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which eventually
altered the U.S. government’s position in the Bob Jones litigation.36 In
1978, under the Carter Administration, the IRS published proposed policy
changes sought by civil rights advocates that would require quantitative

29 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725
(1974)) (discussing the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a), which prohibits injunctive action prior to the assessment or collection of any tax).
30 Id. at 582.
31 Id. at 581-82.
32 Id. at 580.
33 Id. at 574; see Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
34 Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
35 See Johnson, supra note 9, at 135. In Allen v. Wright, a nationwide class of Black families sought to compel the IRS to enforce the new policy nationwide against private schools in
a lawsuit that went up through the courts alongside Bob Jones. In a landmark decision, the
Court denied Article III standing to plaintiffs. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740, 753-60
(1984).
36 Johnson, supra note 9 at 132-38, 144-47.
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evidence of desegregation in order to qualify for tax-exempt status.37 In
response, conservative Congressmembers Dornan and Ashbrook successfully introduced temporary measures to defund any IRS effort “to make
the requirements for tax-exempt status of private schools more stringent
than those [already] in effect.”38 The debates around revocation of tax
exemption for racially segregated schools animated voters, who ushered
in a Republican Senate and President in 1980, after the Republican
platform pledged to “halt the unconstitutional regulatory vendetta
launched by [President] Carter’s IRS commissioner against independent
schools.”39
Johnson observes that “[t]he change in the presidency would produce
the most dramatic events surrounding the Bob Jones litigation in the
Supreme Court,”40 as conservatives actively campaigned the U.S.
Solicitor General to reverse its position to oppose IRS enforcement of its
antidiscrimination policy.41 When the incoming Reagan Administration
signaled its intent to restore tax-exempt status to BJU and moot the
litigation before the Supreme Court,42 blowback from civil rights
advocates compelled the Administration instead to confirm its opposition
to racial segregation while still urging the Court to invalidate the IRS’s
antidiscrimination policy as an unconstitutional overreach of its administrative agency authority.43 Following the Reagan Administration’s
abandonment of the U.S. government’s original litigation position, the
Supreme Court appointed counsel to argue in favor of revocation of taxexempt status from segregated private schools.44
B.

A Roadmap to “Fundamental National Public Policy”

When BJU’s challenge finally reached the Supreme Court on the
merits in the 1982-83 Term, an 8-1 majority upheld the denial of taxexempt status, with seven justices agreeing that Congressional inaction
signaled acquiescence to the IRS’s interpretation of the tax code in accord
with a “fundamental national public policy” (“FNPP”) against racial
37 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 4830-01, 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,297 (Aug. 22, 1978) (“This
revenue procedure sets forth more definitive guidelines to identify those schools that in fact
operate on a discriminatory basis even though they may claim to have racially nondiscriminatory policies.”); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 4830-01-M, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,452 (Feb. 13, 1979)
(“After consideration of the comments and the testimony given at the hearings, the proposed
revenue procedure [published in 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296] has been revised.”).
38 Allen, 468 U.S. at 748 n.16.
39 Johnson, supra note 9, at 144-45.
40 Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 145.
42 Id. at 146.
43 See id. at 146-47.
44 See id. at 147-48.
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segregation, a compelling government interest that did not offend the Free
Exercise Clause.45 Before reaching the free exercise claim, the Court’s
path to finding FNPP took several seemingly laborious steps for judicial
review of agency action in the pre-Chevron context of tax administration.46
First, the Court assessed whether the IRS had acted properly in light
of the common law of charitable trusts that provided the legislative
backdrop for tax exemption for public charities under Internal Revenue
Code (“I.R.C.”) § 501(c)(3) and tax deductions for charitable contributions to such entities under § 170(c).47 Neither provision made mention of
racial or other discrimination; rather, the I.R.C. provided only that such
entities must be “organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, . . . or educational purposes.”48 The legislative judgment that
“charities were to be given preferential treatment because they provide a
benefit to society” stems from common-law charitable trust principles
“deeply rooted in our history, as well as that of England.”49 In assessing
the applicability of the common law of charitable trusts, the Court
acknowledged the legislative history supporting tax-exempt status for
public charities, as “Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable
organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that
serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public
institutions of the same kind.”50
Because “[a] corollary to the public benefit principle is the
requirement, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the purpose of a
charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established public policy,”51
the Court concluded that statutory recognition of tax-exempt status to
public charities likewise excludes organizations that violate “fundamental
national public policy” as expressed by “all three branches of the Federal

45

See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593, 599, 604.
Compare Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592-604, with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (explaining, in its delegation of authority to
an administrative agency, that courts engage in a two-step inquiry to determine whether “silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” and if so, whether the agency’s proposed rule
or policy is based on a “permissible construction of the statute”), and Mayo Found. for Med.
Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011) (“The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context.”).
47 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585-92.
48 Id. at 585 (quoting I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); see id. at 613 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Nowhere is there to be found some additional, undefined public policy requirement.”).
49 Id. at 588-89 (explaining that the categories of charity enumerated in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
derive from Comm’rs for Special of Income Tax v. Pemsel [1891] UKHL [1891] A.C. 531,
583).
50 Id. at 587-88.
51 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591.
46
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Government.”52 The Court then looked to expressions of public policy on
racial segregation by all three branches of federal government to
determine whether a sufficiently “fundamental national public policy”
prohibited racial segregation in private schools.53 Here, the Court
employed a series of string cites to declare: “An unbroken line of cases
following Brown v. Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this
Court’s view that racial discrimination in education violates a most
fundamental national public policy, as well as rights of individuals.”54
Likewise, the Court found that civil rights legislation enacted by
Congress, and various executive orders, prohibited racial segregation in
schools and the military across multiple presidential administrations.55
Against the objection that the IRS exceeded its authority in
interpreting the I.R.C. to foreclose racial discrimination in tax-exempt
public charities, the Court gestured towards the exceptional discretion of
the federal tax agency to enforce collection of revenue:
[E]ver since the inception of the tax code, Congress has seen fit
to vest in those administering the tax laws very broad authority to
interpret those laws. In an area as complex as the tax system, the
agency Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be
able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and new
problems.56
Importantly, the Court treated Congressional inaction on the precise
question of tax-exemption for racially segregated private religious
schools as “unusually strong [evidence] of legislative acquiescence
[toward,] and ratification by implication of,” the IRS’s antidiscrimination
policy.57 In particular, the Court noted that Congress declined to amend
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) over the course of a dozen years in recognition that
such action was unnecessary,58 and furthermore that Congress in 1976
enacted I.R.C. § 501(i) prohibiting racial discrimination for tax-exempt
private social clubs as a way of extending, not curbing, the antidiscrimination prohibition already presumably in effect for § 501(c)(3) under the
Green decision.59 In this way, the Court turned Congressional inaction
52

Id. at 593-96, 598.
Id.
54 Id. at 593 (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of
Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-469
(1973); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
55 Id. at 594-95.
56 Id. at 596.
57 Id. at 599.
58 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 600-01.
59 Id. at 601 (citing Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65 (D.D.C. 1971), summarily aff’d sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971)).
53
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amid political debates around racial discrimination in private schools into
what Johnson characterizes as a form of “reliance” on agency adherence
to prior judicial decisions.60
Having determined that the IRS’s enforcement of its antidiscrimination policy against BJU was a proper exercise of the agency’s
authority,61 the Majority simply declared that the government’s
compelling interest in enforcing an FNPP against racial segregation
outweighed any burden on religious exercise.62 On this final point, the
justices were unanimous: Justice Powell agreed with the point in his
partial concurrence,63 and even Justice Rehnquist, who dissented fully on
the ground that I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) contained no FNPP requirement,
implied or otherwise observed that if it did, such a policy against racial
segregation in theory would not offend free exercise.64
All that remained was for the Court to apply its rule to the case at
hand and determine whether BJU had in fact acted in contravention of a
FNPP by excluding unmarried or interracially married students, which
concededly and openly they had, at least until 1975.65 Since then, BJU
argued, its policy excluded no one from admission unless and until they
actually advocated or engaged in interracial dating or marriage and was
therefore not racially discriminatory.66 At this late stage in the analysis,
the Court looked not to Congress or the executive branch, but only to its
own precedent to state that “decisions of this Court firmly establish that
discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation and association is a form
of racial discrimination.”67
As the Court recognized, its decision in Bob Jones would
“necessitate later determinations of whether given activities so violate
public policy that the entities involved cannot be deemed to provide a
public benefit worthy of ‘charitable’ status.”68 Still, the Court took pains
to indicate the strictness of its test, under which “these sensitive
determinations should be made only where there is no doubt that the
organization’s activities violate fundamental public policy.”69

60

See Johnson, supra note 9, at 128, 160-61.
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 599.
62 Id. at 604.
63 Id. at 606-07 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
64 Id. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., majority opinion).
66 Id. at 605.
67 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n,
410 U.S. 431 (1973)).
68 Id. at 598.
69 Id.
61
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BOB JONES: SLIPPERY SLOPE OR DEAD END?

Testing the Limits of FNPP

The Bob Jones litigation reportedly became a rallying cry for
political strategists seeking to mobilize voters against perceived
encroachment of government regulation on the private sphere, in
particular in the exercise of religious freedom.70 Moral Majority cofounder Paul Weyrich maintained that the true motivation that inspired
conservative religious allies, advocates, and voters in particular to wade
into the public arena as a political force to be reckoned with throughout
the 1980s was not any particular single issue (such as the oft-cited
candidate of abortion), but a common desire for self-defense against
government regulation of the private sphere.71
On the other side, civil rights advocates hoping to expand
antidiscrimination protections by extending FNPP under Bob Jones’s
pronouncement had their work cut out for them to establish additional
FNPPs in all three branches of the federal government.72 Tax-exempt
organizations seeking clear advance notice of fundamental national public
policies enforceable by the IRS could perhaps push for establishment of
“safe harbors,” as proposed by Samuel Brunson and David Herzig:
Each of these . . . lines up with one branch of government: the
courts [could] determine which classifications will trigger strict
scrutiny [under the Equal Protection Clause], Congress [could]
choose[] which classifications will be protected by the Civil
Rights Act, and the Treasury Department could create a blacklist
of behaviors that violate the equal protection test.73
In the absence of consensus by all three branches, however, and with
the risk of a veto by any one branch ever-present, FNPP would seem
impossible to announce “beyond a doubt.”74 In the decades since Bob
70 See Robert Freedman, The Religious Right and the Carter Administration, 48 HIST. J.
231, 235, 238 (2005); Randall Balmer, The Real Origins of the Religious Right, POLITICO
(May 27, 2014), https://perma.cc/NL8U-36B4.
71 See Freedman, supra note 70, at 235; see also Balmer, supra note 70 (describing the
role of Bob Jones University in coalescing multiple concerns, rather than a single issue, among
the religious right).
72 See Samuel D. Brunson & David J. Herzig, A Diachronic Approach to Bob Jones:
Religious Tax Exemptions After Obergefell, 92 IND. L.J. 1175, 1205 (2017) (“Applying the
fundamental public policy doctrine . . . will prove problematic without a framework for determining the boundaries of what constitutes a fundamental public policy . . . . With no guidance
beyond the vagaries that currently define fundamental public policies, judges will be forced
to interject their own moral judgment in the process.”).
73 Id. at 1207-08.
74 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593.
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Jones, no additional FNPP or clear safe harbors have yet emerged,75
despite advances in civil rights protection, for example, for same-sex
marriage under the Fourteenth Amendment,76 and for transgender rights
under Title VII.77
Notwithstanding the difficulty of establishing additional FNPP in
other areas, Bob Jones serves as a reminder of how questions about
allocating public resources can defy political resolution.78 In the decades
and presidential administrations that followed Bob Jones, several
Supreme Court justices have openly warned against further advances
toward Bob Jones’s slippery slope even in cases not governed by taxexemption for public charities. In 1996, for example, when the Court
struck down the male-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military
Institute, a solely state-funded institution, Justice Scalia warned in dissent
that “it is certainly not beyond the Court that rendered today’s decision to
hold that a [federally tax-deductible] donation to a single-sex college
should be deemed contrary to public policy and therefore not deductible
if the college discriminates on the basis of sex.”79 Decades later, at oral
argument in Obergefell v. Hodges,80 G.W. Bush appointee Justice Alito
questioned President Obama’s Solicitor General about the scope and
impact of Bob Jones,81 reportedly triggering 15 states’ attorneys general
to alert the Senate Majority Leader and House Speaker that the IRS could
target religious organizations for revocation of tax-exempt status for
discrimination against same-sex married couples.82 In his dissenting
opinion in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts assigned responsibility for
stoking conservative fears to the U.S. Solicitor General’s “candid[]
acknowledge[ment] that the tax exemptions of some religious institutions
would be in question if they opposed same-sex marriage.”83 More
75

See Brunson & Herzig, supra note 72, at 1189, 1192.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 678, 681 (2015) (“[S]ame-sex couples may now
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States . . . there is no lawful basis for a State to
refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of
its same-sex character.”).
77 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1743, 1754 (2020) (holding that
an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act).
78 Brunson & Herzig, supra note 72, at 1189-90 (discussing how, over the three decades
since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), each of the three branches “clearly
demonstrated its commitment to racial nondiscrimination” in both public and private schools).
79 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bob
Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574).
80 576 U.S. at 681 (2015).
81 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 (No. 14-556).
82 See Marcus Owens, Obergefell, Bob Jones, and the IRS, AHLA CONNECTIONS,
Mar. 2016, at 10, 11.
83 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 711 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
76
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recently, at oral argument in Fulton v. Philadelphia in November 2020, a
case involving a claim of religious infringement under a city foster-care
placement contract prohibiting discrimination against same-sex couples,84 the newest Trump-appointed Associate Justice, Amy Coney
Barrett, sought to “sneak in” a question to counsel for the City of
Philadelphia about the scope of Bob Jones: “I think we would agree that
there’s really not any circumstance we can think of in which racial
discrimination would be permitted as a religious exemption. Can you
think of any example . . . where an objection to same-sex marriage would
justify an exemption? Or is it like racial discrimination?”85
Even as the current Supreme Court so far appears willing to reaffirm
the consensus on racial discrimination announced in Bob Jones, the
concerns expressed by several justices seem more symbolic than actual,
precisely because the decision’s painstakingly narrow reasoning limits its
own reach.86
B.

Unanswered Questions

The Bob Jones Court emphasized the indisputable FNPP as
announced by all three branches of the federal government against racial
segregation in schools, an issue on which there could be “no doubt” and
for which an “unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence”
existed.87 Far from paving the way to expansions of FNPP at all three
federal branches, however, the Bob Jones Court deliberately stepped back
from the brink of several controversial issues, leaving them unresolved.
Importantly, these questions, which were central to the growing movement for critical perspectives on racial integration, inclusion, and
diversity, remain at the forefront of democratic institutional concerns
around the proper interaction of the federal branches today.88
1.

Pluralism

First, even as the Court confined its decision to exclusion of students
based on race, it gave a nod to the primacy of free speech—if not religious
liberty—as a core democratic value in its statutory interpretation analysis.
One of the reasons the Court gave to uphold IRS action was legislative
acquiescence in the IRS’s statutory interpretation, because “few issues
84

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 (2021).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 112-13, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123).
86 Neil Buchanan, Univ. of Fla., Law & Society Association 2021 Annual Meeting
Presentation: Future Generations and Death by Austerity (May 29, 2021) (referring to the
Court’s opinion in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), as “self-negating”).
87 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 598-99.
88 See infra Part III-A.
85
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have been the subject of more vigorous and widespread debate and
discussion in and out of Congress than those related to racial segregation
in education. Sincere adherents advocating contrary views have ventilated
the subject for well over three decades.”89 The Majority did not dwell on
the concern that this FNPP might adversely shut out minority viewpoints.
That mantle was taken up by Justice Powell in his concurrence in part and
in the judgment.90 He agreed that, “if any national policy [was]
sufficiently fundamental” to trump free exercise, the policy against racial
segregation in schools was it.91 Still, as he had in Bakke a few years
earlier, Justice Powell wrote at length to clarify his view that a healthy
democracy depends on the airing of diverse viewpoints competing for
popular support.92 While the Majority reasoned that to qualify for taxexemption as a public charity, an “institution’s purpose must not be so at
odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public
benefit that might otherwise be conferred,”93 Justice Powell objected to
the Majority’s suggestion that a FNPP could be read into a statute, even
with legislative acquiescence, which struck him as permitting the
government to enforce orthodoxy.94 He argued that such a standard would
be contrary to the purposes behind exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),
which are specifically to encourage pluralism and diverse viewpoints or
goals not necessarily shared by government.95 In Bob Jones, Justice
Powell’s view seemed to be that the subject in fact needed more
ventilation and more diverse viewpoints:
[The Majority] suggest[s] that the primary function of a taxexempt organization is to act on behalf of the Government in
carrying out governmentally approved policies. In my opinion,
such a view of § 501(c)(3) ignores the important role played by
tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply
conflicting, activities and viewpoints.96

89

Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 599.
See id. at 606, 609-10 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
91 Id. at 607.
92 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality
opinion) (“The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element.”).
93 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 608.
94 Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
95 Id.
96 Id.
90
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Justice Powell thus preferred to leave to “diversity” and “pluralism”
the task of winnowing out of the best public policy in the free marketplace
of ideas.97
2.

Remedies for Racial Discrimination

Next, while Bob Jones upheld a prohibition on racial segregation in
schools, the Court was crucially silent on the question whether raceconscious remedies for historical segregation in schools—from
affirmatively fostering inclusion to preventing White flight—could be
constitutional, much less an FNPP as expressed by all three branches of
the federal government. The Court thus effectively limited the decision’s
practical impact on private schools by narrowing the FNPP to the issue of
racial segregation without reaching the permissible remedies for racial
disparities, regardless of cause.98 Indeed, while the holding in Bob Jones
relied on an expression of a FNPP against racial segregation,99 the case
arose amid substantial interbranch conflict instead of the touted consensus
of FNPP regarding the constitutionality of school integration plans,
including affirmative action, and specifically “quotas,” under the
fractured Bakke decision.100
The Bob Jones Court thus attempted to establish once and for all a
FNPP prohibiting racial segregation as an issue that had risen above the
fray of public debate to become a policy applicable in every
97

In light of the opinions’ differing attitudes towards the value of pluralism, it is notable
that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim of an unconstitutional burden on religious free exercise got relatively short shrift in each of the Court’s decisions. Yet, Powell’s free-market
speech approach nevertheless foreshadowed the development of so-called “First Amendment
Lochnerism” that would later be used by federal courts to strike down democratically enacted
antidiscrimination protections as unconstitutional regulation of speech and religious practice.
See Nelson Tebbe, A Democratic Political Economy for the First Amendment, 105 CORNELL
L. REV. 959, 960 (2020) (“[First Amendment rights,] which are commonly associated with
democracy, are working to undermine the material conditions for a cooperative society . . .
[such as through] ‘First Amendment Lochnerism.’”); cf. Stanley Aronowitz, Shirley Lung &
Ruthann Robson, Work, Work, and More Work: Whose Economic Rights?, 16 CUNY L. REV.
391, 405 (2013) (criticizing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), on the grounds that the
Supreme Court did not “not just . . . [strike] down the [worker protection] statute [at issue],”
and thereby deprive workers of the benefit of the statutes protection, but also because the
decision implies “that the health and the interest of bakers was not in the interest of the public
good” even as regulations that benefit employers or investors are typically upheld).
98 See supra Part I-A; see also Neal Devins, Comment, Bob Jones University v. United
States: A Political Analysis, 1 J.L. & POL. 403, 420 (1984) (surmising that the Court’s substantive ruling in Bob Jones was intended to “bring to a close an era of judicial activism” on
racial segregation as it prepared to deny standing to third-party plaintiffs to compel the IRS to
enforce even stricter antidiscrimination policies against segregated private schools in Allen,
468 U.S. 737, decided the next Term).
99 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593.
100 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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“circumstance[s] we can think of,” while failing to give future litigants
the tools needed to address harms caused by actually segregated
institutions.101 Indeed, several affirmative-action cases later, the Roberts
Court continued to put the brakes on any actions by the government going
beyond enforcing the barest possible version of an FNPP against racial
segregation, by barring most race-conscious actions, whether to remedy
historical segregation or systemic racism.102 Then-new Chief Justice
Roberts’ tautological pronouncement that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race”
confirmed the Court’s refusal to validate race-conscious remedies for
intentional discrimination beyond a cease-and-desist order.103 Bob Jones
thus marked the outer boundary for FNPP before a more general retreat
of federal courts from adjudicating the merits of civil rights claims.104
3.

Redistributive Economic Justice

Finally, the tax context of Bob Jones permitted the Court to limit the
applicability of its narrow holding to the specific tax-exemption statute at
issue.105 Historically, the Court has employed a form of “tax exceptionalism” to shield tax controversies from public administrative law
principles, including to insulate tax regulation and controversies
regarding collection and redistribution of revenue from judicial review.106
As with questions of economic inequality and social welfare, which are
generally relegated to the political branches,107 “tax exceptionalism” has
101 Transcript of Oral Argument at 112, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868
(2021) (No. 19-123).
102 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747-48
(2007).
103 Id. at 748.
104 See, e.g., Alexander Reinert et al., supra note 16, at 753 (illustrating through discussion
of qualified immunity doctrine how federal court decisions that fail to reach the merits may
“stunt[] the development of constitutional law” so that “[r]ights become frozen, leaving citizens unprotected from future constitutional violations until a court chooses to rule on the constitutional question”).
105 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 601-02.
106 See also Kristin E. Hickman, Administrative Law’s Growing Influence on U.S. Tax
Administration, 3 J. TAX ADMIN. 82, 82-83, 92 (2017) (describing the contemporary trend to
apply administrative law principles to tax administration and thus re-evaluate tax exceptionalism); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Tax: Different, Not Exceptional, 71 ADMIN.
L. REV. 663, 686 (2019)
107 See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV.
203, 204-05 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing view is that issues of poverty and distributive justice
should be resolved through legislative policymaking rather than constitutional adjudication.”)
(citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-37 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
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allowed the Court to avoid critical questions about the redistribution of
revenue, which could upend the status quo.108 In the decades since Bob
Jones, however, the distinction between tax administration and other
forms of behavior regulation has eroded,109 as demonstrated by Chief
Justice Roberts’ recognition in 2012 that “taxes that seek to influence
conduct are nothing new.”110 Despite being cabined to the narrow context
of a tax controversy, the Bob Jones Court’s carefully circumscribed
rationale highlighted early on the ways in which the existing legal
battlefield reflects non-neutral assumptions about whose rights or
expectations should remain undisturbed amid political controversies.
III. LOOKING FORWARD
A.

Dueling Views of CRT

The Court’s move effectively to freeze the status quo in Bob Jones
paralleled the rise of critical race theories, which emerged around the
same time precisely to expose the value-laden assumptions underlying
inequities maintained under existing law. CRT thus treats the questions
left unresolved in Bob Jones not as tangential, but as integral to a full
understanding of democratic law and society. Just as Bob Jones mobilized
advocates on both sides of the political divide, CRT today provides both
frameworks for deepening race-conscious analyses of social institutions,
and fodder for political strategists seeking to mobilize the public against
race-conscious remedies for historical and ongoing institutionalized
oppression.
The transition from the Trump to the Biden Administration involved
dueling executive orders over CRT worthy of the Bob Jones-era
disagreement between the Carter and Reagan Administrations.111 In the
eyes of opponents, CRT’s questioning of legal doctrine becomes its own
form of indoctrination, and consciousness of race and racism transforms
into reverse racial stereotyping.112 Political strategist Christopher Rufo,

108

See, e.g., Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 106, at 686 (recognizing “tax exceptionalism” while rejecting claims that the “only proper goal of tax law is raising revenue” or that
tax is “fundamentally different” from other areas of law, because law regulates behavior
though substantive policy goals).
109 See Hickman, supra note 106, at 82-84, 93 (“In addition to administering an array of
government spending programs through tax expenditures, the IRS is one of the government’s
principal welfare agencies and is heavily involved in regulating the nonprofit and health care
sectors of the economy.”).
110 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 567 (2012).
111 See supra Part I-A.
112 Compare Rashawn Ray & Alexandra Gibbons, Why are States Banning Critical Race
Theory?, BROOKINGS INSTIT.: FIXGOV, https://perma.cc/U9HH-XVZB (last modified Nov. 21,
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the recent progenitor of the anti-CRT movement, admittedly seized upon
CRT’s challenge to racial subordination and oppression as enshrined in
legal doctrine and institutions and lobbied then-President Trump to target
CRT and mobilize opposition to critiques of systemic racism.113 In
response, the Trump Administration promulgated Executive Order
13950, “Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping,” which prohibited
federal agencies from promoting “divisive concepts” about race or sex.114
To guide federal agencies, the Office of Management and Budget then
issued a guidance memo that directed staff to review materials containing
terms such as “‘critical race theory,’ ‘white privilege,’ ‘intersectionality,’
‘systemic racism,’ . . . and ‘unconscious bias’” because “[w]hen used in
the context of diversity training, these terms may help to identify the type
of training prohibited by the E.O.”115 A federal court soon preliminarily
enjoined enforcement of E.O. 13950, citing the policy’s chilling effect on
free expression of critical race perspectives.116
On Inauguration Day 2021, the Biden Administration’s “Advancing
Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the
Federal Government,” revoked Executive Order 13950 and affirmed that
“[e]qual opportunity is the bedrock of American democracy, and our
diversity is one of our country’s greatest strengths.”117 The Biden
Administration followed up six months later with its own E.O.,
“Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce,” which was designed to “establish[] a government-wide initiative
to advance diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility in all parts of the
Federal workforce.”118 In particular, Section 9(a) of the order provides:
The head of each agency shall take steps to implement or increase
the availability and use of diversity, equity, inclusion, and
accessibility training programs for employees, managers, and
leadership. Such training programs should enable Federal
employees, managers, and leaders to have knowledge of systemic
2021), with George F. Will, Opinion, A Teacher Pushes Back Against K-12 Critical Race
Theory Indoctrination, WASH. POST (June 23, 2021, 8:00 AM) https://perma.cc/T55P-BJ7C.
113 See Wallace-Wells, supra note 6.
114 Exec. Order. No. 13,950, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,683, 60,685 (Sept. 22, 2020).
115 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, M-20-37, MEMORANDUM
FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 2 (2020).
116 See Santa Cruz Lesbian and Gay Cmty. Ctr. v. Trump, 508 F. Supp. 3d 521, 540-43,
545-47 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (granting in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction) (describing defendants’ argument that the Diversity Center’s training curriculum
“furthers race and sex stereotypes and scapegoating” as “a gross mischaracterization” of the
kinds of speech Plaintiffs intend to express and “an insult” to the work required to fight discrimination against historically marginalized communities).
117 Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,009, 7,009 (Jan. 20, 2021).
118 See Exec. Order No. 14,035, 86 Fed. Reg. 34,593, 34,594-96 (June 25, 2021).

2022]

WHO’S AFRAID OF BOB JONES?

111

and institutional racism and bias against underserved communities, be supported in building skillsets to promote respectful and
inclusive workplaces and eliminate workplace harassment, have
knowledge of agency accessibility practices, and have increased
understanding of implicit and unconscious bias.119
The key term that is absent from the Trump Administration’s
Executive Order, but highlighted in Executive Order 14035, is “underserved.”120 Critical race theory is, at bottom, a method of examining
purportedly neutral colorblind and “post-racial[]” laws and policies and
chipping away at the veneer of equality that insulates long-standing
disparities that remain enshrined in law.121 CRT questions the view that
increasing access and opportunity alone will suffice to equalize the
playing field.122 Further, it exposes the overreliance of law and economics
on “efficiency” and arm’s length transactions that rationalize differential
outcomes as justified and insulate them from scrutiny.123
CRT is not a single theory, but a range of viewpoints that share a
“questioning” orientation, and that attempt to identify underlying
assumptions and nonneutral legal doctrinal choices.124 Political values are
not accepted as given, but rather are viewed as dependent on positionality,
including material conditions, privilege, and access to information.125
CRT sees a need for race-conscious remedies for structural racism and
disempowerment, and questions essentialist and non-intersectional views
of race, gender, class, and other categories.126 Moreover, CRT analyzes
the interaction of multiple forms of inequity, including disparities based
on sexual orientation or gender identity, that are shaped by social
structures and institutions, such as religious beliefs.127
Indeed, one of the central tenets of CRT is that race is far from a
fixed, unchangeable biological condition; on the contrary, race is
constituted by and through social structures and institutions, including
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Id. at 34,599.
Compare id. at 34,594, 34,597-99, with Exec. Order No. 13,950, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,683,
60,683-89 (Sep. 22, 2020).
121 See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: A PRIMER 5-15 (2018).
122 See id. at 12-13, 44-45.
123 See David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 11-13 (2006).
124 See BRIDGES, supra note 121, at 8-9 (“[T]here is no Critical Race Theory; instead,
‘there are critical race theories.’”); see also Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the
Twenty-First Century, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2004) [hereinafter Brown,
Fighting Racism].
125 See BRIDGES, supra note 121, at 12.
126 Id. at 14-15.
127 See The Ass’n of Am. L. Sch., supra note 2.
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law or religious belief.128 As such, race is “socially real”—Khiara M.
Bridges writes, even if not biological or genetic, a “social construction”
but with real material impact and consequences.129 Accordingly, “law is
not merely regulating race and the relations between the various races,
but is actively constituting race and the relations between the various
races.”130 Against this persistent construction of race as a potentially
subordinating characteristic, CRT posits no single methodology or
solution that could be considered doctrinaire, but orients the frame of
vision to one that explicitly centers relative power and inequity.131
Transforming the law, and not just public opinion or political process
participation, requires bringing what has been excluded from discussion
explicitly into legal analysis. Hence, critical race theorists seek to bring
the real world and its effects—subordination, power disparities, and
economic inequality—within the scope of legal analysis, where, as Bob
Jones shows, they cannot be ignored by any branch of the federal
government. In evaluating the lessons of Bob Jones, David Brennen
questioned the free-market economic assumptions underlying the Court’s
views of pluralism and democracy.132 He argued for a more nuanced,
informed “contextual diversity” that would transform tax policy’s
overemphasis on efficiency and laissez-faire economics, to the raceconscious and explicitly anti-subordination orientation of critical race
theory.133 Such a framework would recharacterize economic and tax
questions regarding longstanding disparities in power and privilege based
on race, not as controversies reserved for the political battleground, but
as fundamental democratic concerns for every branch of government,
including the courts:
Contextual diversity requires that various aspects of the charitable
tax exemption be examined, not only with the aim of maximizing
efficiency, but also with the broader aim of advancing
conceptions of justice that go beyond positive economic analysis
to include fairness and other ideas important to a democratic
society. Thus, in addition to using economic analysis to examine
tax-exempt charity law, scholars and others could possibly
discover more diverse and different meanings in tax-exempt
charity law by drawing on appropriate non-economic legal

128
129
130
131
132
133

Id.; BRIDGES, supra note 121, at 10-11.
BRIDGES, supra note 121, at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
See Brennen, supra note 123, at 19.
Id. at 54.
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approaches to law, such as CRT or others . . . . In the end, the
objective should be justice, not just efficiency.134
Dorothy Brown argues, conversely, that the impact of CRT would be
blunted without incorporation of empirical methodology and economic
analysis, given how embedded law and economics theories are in the legal
mainstream.135
CRT shares roots with critical tax scholarship, which similarly
questions assumptions behind law and economics, market-efficiency, and
private ordering of economic issues consigned to the political arena.136
Reading Bob Jones in light of additional lessons from CRT is a way of
“embrac[ing] unquantifiable inquiries,” which critical tax scholarship
tells us may in fact be not only quantifiable, but central to democratic selfgovernance.137 In the narrow context of tax administration, “[s]uch
qualitative priorities include tax law’s effect on taxpayer dignity,
collective self-determination, legal transparency, and solidarity within a
diverse community.”138 In the broader context of the society that tax
administration supports, CRT supplies a framework for these inquiries,
not merely to identify, but also to “redress[] concerns of power,
inequality, and democracy.”139
B.

CRT and the Current Supreme Court

As the current Supreme Court—with six Republican appointees
(including three justices appointed by the Trump Administration)140—
134

Id.
See Brown, Fighting Racism, supra note 124, at 1489 (“The argument in favor of the
co-existence of empirical legal scholarship and CRT is, simply put, an attempt to reach out to
White America . . . because many White Americans believe that the passage of civil rights
laws in the twentieth century has eliminated all but isolated incidents of racism.”); see also
Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Should the IRS Know Your Race? The Challenge of Colorblind Tax
Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2019) (discussing how “[t]he disparate treatment of race and
ethnicity across tax and nontax data” is so common among federal agencies that the Social
Security Agency standardized collections and reporting as early as the late 1970s); see generally DOROTHY BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH 203 (2021) [hereinafter BROWN,
WHITENESS OF WEALTH] (“[T]here’s no justifiable reason for the government not to collect
and make public tax statistics by race.”).
136 See ANTHONY C. INFANTI & BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 11-12, 39-41, 107-08, 269 (2009); see also Jeremy Bearer-Friend et al., Taxation and Law and Political Economy, 83 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 6668) (on file with author).
137 Bearer-Friend et al., supra note 136 (manuscript at 68).
138 Id. (manuscript at 8 n.26).
139 Compare id. (manuscript at 70), with BRIDGES, supra note 121, at 5-15.
140 See Joan Biskupic, Trump’s Appointees are Turning the Supreme Court to the Right
with Different Tactics, CNN (July 26, 2021) [hereinafter Biskupic, Trump’s Appointees],
https://perma.cc/X5UY-ZTB3.
135
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moves further away from enforcement of civil rights claims and towards
traditionally conservative positions, including insulation of private and
religious spheres from government regulation,141 it faces criticism for
partisanship and bias that threaten its credibility and integrity as an
institution.142 Under its current composition, civil rights claimants may
see little hope for gain in the short term. The potential hostility of the
current Court to claims of race-conscious efforts to remedy disparate
impacts of embedded racism, such as affirmative action, has already been
confirmed by Justice Alito’s casual observation in Brnovich, a case
upholding voting restrictions, stating that disproportionate burdens on
voters of color are an inevitable consequence of justifiable gaps in
socioeconomic status: “To the extent that minority and non-minority
groups differ with respect to employment, wealth, and education, even
neutral regulations, no matter how crafted, may well result in some
predictable disparities in rates of voting.”143 The assumption that any rules
could be neutral in this state of affairs, and the lack of discomfort with
perpetuation of existing disparities regardless of cause, absolves the state
of any responsibility to remedy such disparities.144
Then again, in this climate, civil rights advocates would seem to have
little reason not to engage in even more assertive advocacy, asking each
branch to confront, rather than ignore, factors historically insulated from
debate and not traditionally associated with mainstream legal theories.145
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Id. (“[The Supreme Court] curtailed the reach of the Voting Rights Act, threatened the
ability of states to impose disclosure requirements on political donors and strengthened property rights in the face of government regulation.”); see also Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court
Effectively Delays Challenge to Harvard Affirmative Action Policies for Several Months, CNN
(June 14, 2021) [hereinafter Biskupic, Harvard Affirmative Action], https://perma.cc/LP2KBC9D (“[F]or several months a case that could end nationwide practices that have boosted the
admission of Black and Latino students for decades.”).
142 See, e.g., Darragh Roche, Supreme Court Justices Insist They Aren’t Partisan. Americans Disagree, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 21, 2021, 8:37 AM), https://perma.cc/4ZF2-EFGU (reporting poll results indicating “that viewing the Court’s decisions as politically motivated cut
across the partisan divide” among Republicans, Democrats, and independents); see generally
Evan Osnos, Biden Inherits F.D.R.’s Supreme Court Problem, NEW YORKER (Apr. 18, 2021),
https://perma.cc/34FV-YB3D (describing the Biden Administration’s appointment of a commission to study Supreme Court reforms, including term limits and possible expansion of
size).
143 Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2339 (2021).
144 See BROWN, WHITENESS OF WEALTH, supra note 135, at 17 (noting significant housing,
employment, and wealth gaps between Black and White Americans resulting not from immutable differences but because Black Americans have had “little more than fifty years”—in
essence, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act—during which to exercise the same rights
that have been available to White Americans “for more than two centuries”).
145 Cf., e.g., Bearer-Friend et al., supra note 136 (manuscript at 68-70) (asking tax scholars
to “embrace unquantifiable inquiries” in order to reorient legal thought, avoid incrementalism,
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Yet, some court watchers predict a potentially more cautious avoidance
of controversial decision-making in the future, and less “judge-created
policy masquerading as law.”146 Aaron Tang, for example, foresees a
version of “harm-avoider constitutionalism” taking hold as a potential
form of more fact-sensitive balancing of harms that could permit narrow
exceptions from burdensome regulation.147 While Tang argues that the
Court, based on the facts and context of specific cases, could explicitly
seek to mitigate harm to the stakeholders least able to avoid it,148 critical
race and other critical theorists suggest that the identification of which
harms—and, indeed, which stakeholders—count in the Court’s calculus
is still contested.149
As petitioners seek to revisit controversies and overturn established
precedent,150 “court watchers” note that the Court could take a more
prudential, incremental path toward doctrinal change to preserve its
integrity and predictability.151 Crucially, this path might not always end,
as in the past, where stare decisis or deference to Congress would lead;
on the contrary, more settled precedent could be overturned, but through
less transparent means.152 In response to concerns that the Supreme Court,
prioritize equality and democracy, and adequately address “economic, environmental, institutional, racial, and public health crises”).
146 Johnson, supra note 9, at 26.
147 See Aaron Tang, Harm-Avoider Constitutionalism, 109 CAL. L. REV. 1847, 1886, 1904
(2021).
148 Id. at 1886.
149 See BROWN, WHITENESS OF WEALTH, supra note 135, at 201-02 (comparing disparate
outcomes in tax protests by plaintiffs of different races where Black Americans “needed an
entire tax system overthrown” because litigation primarily assists individual taxpayers rather
than “an entire population” of Black Americans); Bearer-Friend et al., supra note 137 (manuscript at 68-69) (identifying the need to “embrace unquantifiable inquiries”); see generally
INFANTI & CRAWFORD, supra note 136, at 11 (“Critical tax scholars ask why the tax laws are
the way they are and what impact tax laws have on historically disempowered groups, such as
people of color; women of all colors; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered individuals;
low-income and poor individuals; the disabled; and nontraditional families.”).
150 See Biskupic, Trump’s Appointees, supra note 140 (identifying bellwether Supreme
Court cases on the docket that could change the law “regarding abortion rights, gun control,
religion and LGBTQ clashes”).
151 See, e.g., Elliot Williams, Opinion, Supreme Court’s Staggering Deviation from Precedent, CNN, https://perma.cc/69EZ-X5KR (last modified Apr. 23, 2021, 6:33 PM) (Court’s
readiness to overturn precedent diminishes the “predictability [that] is critical for helping the
public understand what its rights are”); Shay Dvoretzky & Emily Kennedy, SCOTUS Term
Marked by Unexpected Alignments and Incrementalism, https://perma.cc/V3L2-VEGS (last
modified July 26, 2021, 11:27 AM) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court, in its most recent Term,
“often forged agreement on narrower grounds than expected—likely reflecting the [C]ourt’s
distaste for being seen as another political actor in a highly polarized and volatile time”).
152 See Steve Vladeck, “Shadow Dockets” Are Normal. The Way SCOTUS Is Using Them
Is the Problem., SLATE (Apr. 12, 2021, 6:09 PM), https://perma.cc/7J2S-XRN3 (“[I]t is the
extent to which the justices [use] it . . . to issue significant rulings that change the rights . . .
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far from adopting any tenets of CRT, will work an even more dramatic
rollback of civil rights than in recent decades,153 including possibly
overturning more of its own precedents traditionally upheld under
principles of stare decisis, Richard Re anticipates the Court’s shift to a
more “[m]alleable, merits-sensitive” relationship to its own precedent
precisely as a way to maintain a less volatile method of exercising its role
vis-à-vis the other branches of government.154 At the same time as the
Court faces pressures from reformers exploring new options for “court
packing,”155 Re acknowledges the criticism of “stare decisis skeptics,
including both formalists who would abolish precedent as illegitimate and
realists who view case law as an irrelevance or subterfuge.”156 In this
climate, Re argues that the Court could take a more flexible approach,
adhering to precedent where doing so would maximize efficiency by
providing a “shortcut” to uniform, predictable outcomes, as well as in
cases where the Court “may face a special likelihood of scrutiny,”157 and
where adhering to precedent could shield the Court from political
blowback. In this way, the Court may actually “resist political and other
pressures to deviate from case law.”158 Such a cautious approach would
help the Court to “manage controversial legal transitions” that work a
reversal of settled law nonetheless.159
Ultimately, the methods by which the Court achieves its outcomes
may matter less and less as political and public opinion become more
polarized. Neil Buchanan and Michael Dorf examine two of the most
influential strands of formalist legal methodology—originalism and
textualism (“O & T”) and law and economics (“L & E”)—each widely
credited with generating outcomes that maintain a strict separation of
of millions of Americans, all without the daylight (including multiple rounds of briefing, oral
argument, and lengthy opinions setting out principled reasons for the decision) that comes
with plenary review.”).
153 See, e.g., Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Supreme Court’s Surprising Term, NEW YORKER,
(July 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/8J53-7GFM (noting that Trump Administration appointments to the Supreme Court “creat[ed] a six-Justice conservative majority” that seemed designed to secure losses for progressive causes for “at least a generation”); Linda Greenhouse,
Opinion, What the Supreme Court Did for Religion, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2021),
https://perma.cc/7VLR-7ZP8 (describing the Court’s elevation of religious freedom to “mostfavored nation” status without overturning precedent as a radical and overlooked sea-change).
154 Richard M. Re, Precedent as Permission, 99 TEX. L. REV. 907, 907, 937 (2021).
155 See Osnos, supra note 142.
156 Re, supra note 154, at 929.
157 Id. at 924-25 (“The permission model . . . giv[es] giving judges with diverse views a
relatively easy, accurate, and shared means of reaching lawful outcomes in the mine-run of
cases . . . [with an] efficiency [that] allows it to foster uniformity and consistency in outcomes.”).
158 Id. at 907.
159 Id.
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powers and corresponding exclusion of economic and civil rights claims
from federal court adjudication.160 Buchanan and Dorf question the lockstep consistency of these purportedly distinct forms of reasoning in
generating conservative outcomes in favor of property interests and
against regulation,161 stating, “Put starkly, anything and everything can be
described as both efficient and inefficient, depending upon what one
determines to be the proper legal baselines that govern and enable market
interactions.”162 They go on to question why, intellectual dishonesty
apart, such patently malleable doctrines are not more regularly deployed
by progressive claimants to reach opposite ends in a kind of tit-for-tat
process.163 They surmise that the mere association of formalist doctrines,
with or without basis, with conservative outcomes, explains their lack of
use by progressives.164 Whether or not this conclusion holds, it would
seem to make ample room for an even wider range of diverse alternative
methodologies, such as CRT.
Bob Jones provides one example of how to navigate the choices and
challenges facing the federal branches of government in identifying,
implementing, and shaping policies and preferences in fraught areas
involving regulation of behavior through distribution of resources,
including through tax-exempt status. As a case that involves the
interaction of public law, antidiscrimination regulation, and collection of
revenue for public institutions, the decision, limited as it is, acknowledges
and confronts head-on the challenges of shaping law—through judicial
interpretation, through institutional interactions in legislatures and
government agencies, and through consideration of factors previously
excluded from analysis. Ultimately, the question is not whether all three
branches have expressed a “fundamental national public policy,”165 but
whether they are fully—and critically—engaged in the interbranch
dialogue that an inclusive and equitable democracy demands, and that
CRT inspires.
The lesson of Bob Jones may be that no matter how vigorous the
Court’s attempts to relegate political and policy controversies to the
public sphere, far from receding into the background, CRT and other
critical theories are likely to accelerate the movement of equity
concerns—those concerns with real-world impact on real-life people—
from the political and public spheres into legal doctrine, and back again.
160

Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two Formalisms: How Law and Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 591, 637 (2021).
161 Id. at 596.
162 Id. at 675.
163 Id. at 672-73.
164 Id. at 674.
165 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593.
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CONCLUSION
In hindsight, as Olatunde Johnson observes, far from settling
political controversy around racial segregation in democratic society, Bob
Jones “provides an account of the dynamic interaction among a Supreme
Court critical of racial integration, a Congress divided on this issue, and
a presidency at war with itself.”166 As the Carter Administration gave way
to the “Reagan revolution,” the IRS faced shifting executive priorities, as
well as the threat that the enforcement of antidiscrimination policies
governing tax-exemption under the tax code would be defunded by
Congress.167 “In the end,” Johnson concludes, “the case reveals how all
three branches of government (as well as the public) interact to shape a
statute’s meaning.”168 Decades later, the same kind of dynamic interaction
continues to be necessary, as political controversy around public funding
for race-conscious and other critiques of U.S. law and society have
resulted in calls to “Stop CRT.”169
Bob Jones may hold minimal precedential value for the current
Supreme Court’s civil rights docket; yet, as a touchstone, the case holds
powerful lessons for reframing and rethinking future legislative,
executive, and judicial decision-making against the backdrop of mercurial
public opinion (in other words, for maintaining a functional democracy).
The ultimate legacy of Bob Jones may be its open struggle with
controversial issues surrounding the redistribution of public resources in
accordance with democratic values—a struggle repeatedly confronted by
a Court perceived as disavowing responsibility for difficult resolutions or
remedies.170
Whatever the fate of Bob Jones itself, as good law, historical
curiosity, or cultural symbol—the case highlights the external pressures
that inevitably face the Court as well as its unique role in distinguishing
among seemingly irreconcilable interests, including deciding when,
whether, and how the judicial branch weighs in on political controversies
in the first instance. For all of its unique features and limiting language,
the Bob Jones decision invites, or even demands, critical engagement with
the hidden assumptions and invisible consequences of decisions by all
three governmental branches. As illuminated by the interventions of CRT,
Bob Jones remains vital not only for public and political debate, but for

166

See Johnson, supra note 9, at 126.
See supra Part I-A.
168 See Johnson, supra note 9, at 126.
169 See generally Stop CRT Act, H.R. 3179, 117th Cong. (2021).
170 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, The Supreme Court Just Abdicated Its Most
Important Role: Enforcing the Constitution, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2019, 10:19 AM),
https://perma.cc/PQP2-S2TS.
167
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analyzing the very foundations of law and U.S. democratic institutions
themselves, as critical theories of race take root in a diverse and delicate
democracy.

